Intel's Out, NVIDIA's In: Most Sentiment-Induced Dow 30 Index Change Ever?

Long-time readers of this blog know that I am always interested when the owners of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) announce a change to one or more of the index’s 30 components (do a search for “Dow” on this site to see past articles). Usually it is a very good lesson in sentiment-based investing and happens at a time that will only hurt the index’s future performance (take out the losers and replace them with high-flyers). The latest change announced late last week might take the cake though. Intel (INTC) is out after 25 years and is being replaced by Nvidia (NVDA).

Intel was added to the Dow on November 1, 1999, just months before the tech bubble peaked in March 2000, which is yet another data point supporting the idea that Dow changes can serve as strong contrarian indicators (changes to large indices are mostly based on market cap, whereas since the Dow only has 30 companies, it’s basically a handful of people making a discretionary call on their own).

So where was Intel trading when it was added in late 1999 versus where it is today? On a split-adjusted basis INTC shares closed at $21.99 each the day before being added to the Dow. Now 25 years later, INTC closed at $21.52 just before the change was announced. Sure, there were some dividend payments made to shareholders along the way, but that just means the stock has compounded at barely above zero precent a year for nearly three decades since being added to the Dow.

As if there weren’t enough buyer beware signals for NVIDIA stock already (e.g. massive stock sales by the CEO constantly), this is yet another sign of extreme public sentiment. Much of it may very well be deserved… the question is simply whether all of it is.

U.S. Stock Market Value Concentration Now Narrowest On Record

Do you remember the first time a U.S. listed company reached a market value of $1 trillion? If it doesn’t seem like that milestone was achieved that long ago, that’s because it’s only been six years (Apple, in the summer of 2018). The tech giant at that point comprised about 4% of the S&P 500 index’s total value. A nice chunk for sure, but hardly astonishing or potentially problematic.

Fast forward to mid-2024 and the value concentration has gotten far more narrow. We now have three companies (Apple, along with Microsoft and NVIDIA) that carry market values of more than $3 trillion each. The trio together comprise more than 20% of the S&P 500 index’s market value. Think about that… 0.6% of the stocks comprise more than 20% of the value. It truly is the most concentrated market we’ve ever seen.

Market technicians often monitor overall breadth closely to try and gauge general market conditions, but since I am a more fundamental investor I don’t have much in the way of statistics to share on that front. What I have noticed, though, is that the bulk of the U.S. stock market has stagnated.

Consider the Russell 3000 index (which comprises about 90% of all major exchange listed U.S. stocks) and its offshoots; the Russell 2000 (smallest 2,000) and Russell 1000 (largest 1,000). As of yesterday’s close, on a year-to-date basis, the Russell 2000 was unchanged for the year, whereas the Russell 1000 was up 14%. If we distinguish between the market-cap weighted S&P 500 index and the equal-weighted version, we see a similar pattern (cap-weighted up 15%, equal-weighted up 5%.

Narrow breadth in and of itself, while not a great sign, doesn’t concern me too much. The bigger issue I see is the euphoria surrounding a very narrow group of stocks. When my golfing buddies and young relatives (neither having showed any interest in the market before) are all talking about buying NVIDIA, all it does is remind me of other moments of maximum stock market bullishness… and how they rarely last.

Selling Too Early: When Focusing Too Much On Valuation Punches Back Hard

The longer you invest in the public markets the easier it is to identify your past mistakes. While these errors have cost you some money before, hopefully you can learn enough to reduce those losses in the future. Until I reach an age where my memory starts failing me, the cases where I sold too early will be a constant (positive) reminder that getting too worked up about near-term valuations for stocks with excellent long-term outlooks can result in leaving a lot of money on the table.

Back in 2011 I lived in Pittsburgh where my now-wife was getting her PhD. A short stroll from our apartment was a fellow RIA (hat tip to Ron Heakins with OakTree Investment Advisors - hope you are doing well my friend) who organized regular meetings with local investment advisors to share ideas and stay on top of an ever-changing industry. I recently came across a brief PowerPoint slide deck I shared with the group back then over a weekend breakfast meeting at Bruegger’s Bagels. In hindsight, it exemplifies how selling too early for not the best reasons can cause heartburn down the road.

You can view the 5-slide deck on AutoZone (AZO) here and I will summarize it below.

The investment thesis was fairly simple. AutoZone held a strong position in a mature, economically insensitive industry and was using its prodigious free cash flow to conduct massive share repurchases (in lieu of taking the more tax inefficient dividend route). The ever-smaller share count helped AZO turn 7% annual sales growth into 22% annual earnings growth from fiscal 1998 through 2011, propelling the stock price to 21% annualized gains during that time (to $325 per share by late 2011).

Since I thought the trend was likely to continue, it was a worthwhile idea to share with our group. Simply put, AZO appeared to be a wonderful buy and hold stock and with the economic uncertainty still lingering in 2011 from the Great Recession, the business outlook appeared quite resilient regardless of where we were in the business cycle.

I can’t recall when I sold the stock after that, but I can tell you it has been an “on again, off again” investment during the ensuing 13 years for me and my clients, largely due to peaks and troughs in the stock’s relative valuation even as the core underlying story has remained unchanged the entire time. In hindsight, that was not the right call. The correct move was to simply buy and hold.

Despite AZO stock compounding at 21% per year from 1998 through 2011, the 2012-2024 period has seen similar performance, with the shares compounding at 20% per year to the recent price of $3,100. Trying to exit when it was overbought and add when oversold not only added more work than was needed, but also undoubtedly resulted in lower returns over the long term. Lesson learned.

Full Disclosure: No position in AZO at the time of writing, but positions may change at any time

Shares of Coffee Giant Starbucks Look Appealing After 5-Year Lull

With shares of Starbucks (SBUX) trading around 2019 levels (low 90’s) despite sales and free cash flow that are running well above pre-pandemic levels, I am getting close to boosting my firm’s exposure for my clients. With both a P/E and a P/FCF multiple in the mid 20’s, SBUX fetches a price at the low end of historical valuation ranges despite a competitive position that remains as strong as ever today.

5 Year Price Chart of Starbucks SBUX Stock (2/5/24)

The recent stock price weakness can be linked to negative press (a small but growing subset of stores whose workers believe unionizing is the answer to their prayers), as well as ever-rising retail pricing driven by underlying inflation that threatens to reduce consumer visits.

The first concern seems quite manageable given the overall size of the company. A few hundred unionized stores out of nearly 20,000 total in North America will hardly bite the company’s income statement. I believe the union momentum is likely slowing due to unimpressive results thus far (the two sides have yet to come to an agreement on a contract despite months and months of back and forth). The strongest evidence that disgruntled SBUX employees are simply looking for a scapegoat becomes evident when the media presses them on why they don’t simply quit and work somewhere else. After all, if SBUX treats their employees so badly relative to other chains, a mass exodus of good workers would probably be quite successful in getting SBUX executives to play ball.

Interestingly, the union hopefuls respond to such suggestions by pointing out that they can’t make as much money elsewhere and the benefits aren’t as good. This is true, of course, relative to smaller, more local coffee shops nationwide, but it blunts the impact of their pro-union arguments in almost comical fashion. Basically, SBUX is a better place to work than most other food service companies, but since they can’t get everything they want, they’re going to unionize. I suspect this flawed logic (they don’t really have any negotiating leverage) is why the vast majority of SBUX workers have not pursued a union vote and seem generally happy with their jobs.

The concern of inflation is always real, as SBUX has been forced to raise prices materially like everybody else in recent years. But for decades now the SBUX customer has generally seen the product as a relatively affordable luxury and regulars keep coming back during the ups and downs of most economic cycles. It is hard to see that trend changing now, after it withstood the Great Recession and the pandemic. As a result, the odds that SBUX continues to be a mature, dominant food service business with cash-cow characteristics for many decades to come appear quite high.

All in all, I view SBUX as a phenomenal business that currently trades near historical troughs in valuation terms (I went back about a decade to make that assessment). Don’t get me wrong - it’s far from dirt cheap, but great businesses rarely are, and buying high quality at very reasonable prices has served long-term investors very well over the long term.

Full Disclosure: Long shares of SBUX personally and for some clients, with the latter group likely to see larger purchases in the near future.