DoorDash IPO Highlights Relative Value of Uber Shares

With the DoorDash (DASH) IPO having gone far better than anyone thought, making the stock untouchable at this point from my vantage point, the real takeaway for me is how cheap Uber Technologies (UBER) stock appears on a relative basis. According to Uber management, they expect margins in the rides business to be 50% above that of the food delivery business. This is undoubtedly due to the restaurant being the middleman for Uber Eats, with no third party involved in the legacy Uber rides division. With that in mind, consider the data below when valuing DASH and UBER, with the latter only operating in the food delivery space:

Uber 2019 “Rides” Revenue: $10.9 billion

Uber 2020 “Eats” Revenue (1/1-9/30): $2.5 billion

Current UBER equity market value at $53/share: $93 billion

DoorDash 2020 Revenue (1/1-9/30): $1.9 billion

Current DASH equity market value at $158/share: $62 billion

Based on the current business mix of both companies, how should Uber be valued relative to DASH? Is ~50% more a reasonable amount? Something to think about for sure.

Full Disclosure: Long shares of Uber at the time of writing, but positions may change at any time

Airbnb and Doordash: So Much For A More Efficient IPO Pricing Process

This week was supposed to be a coming out party for a new IPO pricing process dubbed the "hybrid auction.” Newly public companies have long complained that large first day gains for their stocks enriched institutional investors with immediate profits, with no corresponding benefit to the listing firms. Given that an IPO is often desired to raise additional growth capital, being forced to “leave money on the table” is a big disservice to these young firms.

Inefficient IPO pricing is not surprising given the actors involved. Companies are advised by investment banking firms, whose job it is to allocate stock to their large institutional clients. The incentive, then, is to keep your clients happy and instantaneous profits on day one certainly accomplishes that. While a higher IPO price would give the banks a bigger take on the total deal value, a company can only go public once. The ongoing long-term relationships the banks have with their buy side clients are far more profitable and important. As a result, the banks have little reason to price IPOs as close to market demand as possible. It is a simple conflict of interest situation.

This new “hybrid auction” idea was supposed to help with this problem. Rather than picking a price and then taking orders from investors, the new model does set an initial price indication, but it asks would-be buyers to not only submit how many shares they want to buy, but also allows them to offer the price they are willing to pay. The idea is to get a better gauge of demand by seeing just how high buyers will offer if they think a higher bid will increase their odds of getting stock.

Perhaps you can see the problem already. A buyer of an IPO wants to get the lowest price possible to maximize their potential profit. By giving buyers input into the price they end up paying, they have an incentive to keep the price low, without being insulting or risking missing out to other buyers. So, the most likely outcome is that buyers submit strong bids, maybe even a bit higher than the indicated price range, but without getting too aggressive. Therefore, the real demand is never determined, because you would be crazy to bid anywhere near the highest possible price you are willing to pay.

The results this week were therefore quite predictable (huge first day price spikes) but I think the end result was even worse than most would have guessed. DoorDash (DASH) priced at $102 and opened at $182 (+78%). The Airbnb (ABNB) deal was even worse, with an opening trade of $146, a stunning 115% above the $68 IPO price.

So what is the solution? Well, Google (GOOG) had the right idea back in 2004 when it opted for a dutch auction for its IPO. The company saw a first day price increase of just 18% because it decided to actually sell its stock to the highest bidder (what a novel concept!). A dutch auction simply sells the available stock at the highest price possible. Potential buyers submit a max buy price and a desired quantity and the IPO price is set to be the highest price such that there is a bid for every share being sold. For some odd reason, companies have not copied the Google approach. Until they do, they stand to keep leaving a ton of money on the table with nobody else to blame but themselves.

One innovation is worth mentioning as having been successful and that is the “direct listing.” Many private companies are profitable and don’t necessarily need to raise additional growth capital via an IPO. However, they still might want to be a public company in order to provide their shareholders and employees liquidity and also have a currency with which to make acquisitions. In a direct listing, the existing shares outstanding simply begin trading on the stock exchange, which opens them up to everyone. The market price is immediately known and there is no “first day pop” because no actual IPO price needs to be settled on (no new stock is being sold, so no price for a sale is needed).

The only possible downside for a direct listing is that all of the shares are dumped on the market at the same time and so it could be met with a large wave of selling early on. While not indicative of any problem at the firm, optics are important and a falling stock price will always raise questions. The solution, however, is quite simple. A rolling lock-up expiration - say, 10% of the stock each month for 10 months - would require holders to sell slowly over time to cash out, and therefore would have a minimal impact on the stock price.

So here we sit and Airbnb and DoorDash have two problems; 1) they left billions on the table, and 2) their stock prices are so high that it will be harder for them to attain the financial expectations that are embedded in the current price. Both of those are detriments to the very people they were trying to help with the IPO (their shareholders).

Will Stocks Really Trade at 22x Forward 12-Month Profits By December 2021?

Goldman Sachs just raised their year-end 2021 price target for the S&P 500 index to 4,300. That implies a 20% gain over the next year or so. The call got a lot of attention, perhaps unsurprisingly, as they expect an above-consensus profit figure for the index next year of $175 (current consensus calls for $165). Just as bullish, they expect stocks can fetch 22 times forward 12-month profits (estimated at $195 for 2022), which is where the 4.300 figure comes from.

There is a lot to unpack here. At first blush, both the valuation multiple and the profit estimate appear wildly optimistic. Predicting $175 of S&P profits in 2021, when 2019 was a record-breaking year registering just $157 seems a bit silly to me at this point. Historically, it takes more than 1 year for corporate profits to fully recover from recessionary declines (e.g. 3 years for the dot-com bubble and 2 years for the financial crisis). The pandemic seems severe enough that a shorter than average recovery might not be in the cards. Personally, I would be very surprised if corporate profits in 2021 surpassed those earned in 2019 (2022 would be a far more convincing thesis).

The other issue here is assuming a forward P/E ratio of 22 times, assigned to record-high profits. I understand interest rates are at record-lows, but if the economy really does recover swiftly in 2021, the 10-year bond rate will almost certainly rise from the current sub-1% level. If we return to 2% on the 10-year bond (where we ended 2019), there should be some downward pressure on valuations.

Stocks rarely trade for 22 times forward profits. Between 2010 and 2019, during which the 10-year bond hovered in the 2-3% range, the S&P 500 ended each calendar year at an average of 16 times forward profits, with the range being 13x-20x. In fact, I have data going all the way back to 1960 and the only time the S&P 500 has traded for 22x forward profits or more, during an economic expansion, was the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s.

If I was a strategist who was tasked with publishing S&P 500 targets (thank goodness I’m not), and I felt pretty bullish about where things were headed, I might be willing to project a 20x forward P/E. As far as profits go, let’s say 2021 matches 2019 and 2022 brings a profit increase that is double the historical average (12% instead of 6%) to account for pent-up demand from the pandemic. In that scenario, 2022 profits would be $176 and the S&P 500 at year-end 2021 would be quoted at 3,520.

I know what you are thinking; the S&P 500 is already trading at 3,560 today! See the issue? The market right now is pricing in a very optimistic outlook for the impending recovery. Put another way, for stocks to register above-average gains over the next 1-2 years (as Goldman is predicting), corporate profits need to show stunning gains and blow through 2019 levels by a wide margin.

Is that scenario completely out of the question? Of course not. Would I have a high degree of confidence at this point that such an outcome is the most likely? Not at all. Unfortunately, the market being near all-time highs now, before the economic recovery has really begun, means that a lot of good news is already priced into equity prices. Of course, markets are supposed to be forward-looking, so this is not surprising. But it should, and usually does, impact future returns.

Is Insurance Really a Subscription Service?

Ever since software companies transitioned away from selling software by requiring a large upfront investment and instead offered a cheaper, recurring monthly subscription, the investor community has cheered and rewarded public software firms with much higher valuations. It is very common for “software as a service” businesses to fetch 10 times annual revenue (perhaps double their prior valuations) and less mature high growth subsectors within enterprise software are getting multiple of 20, 30, or even 40 times revenue. Heck, Zoom Video (ZM) currently sports a 46x price to sales ratio based on expected 2021 sales.

Unsurprisingly, anyone who is trying to raise venture capital or goose their stock price is trying to make the case that they offer a recurring revenue, subscription model. What I find odd is that some of the oldest, most mature businesses in the world actually operate this way, but they get ignored. Why shouldn’t Portland General Electric Company (POR) trade for 10 times sales rather than 1.5x? What about Verizon (VZ) and its meager multiple of 1.9x sales? Do they not provide investors with ideal examples of predictable, recurring revenue, monthly subscription business models?

I could shout from rooftops about how all of these businesses should be valued based on their profits rather than sales and that Wall Street has rewarded companies with predictable revenue (fewer quarterly surprises relative to expectations) with higher valuations for decades. “It’s 2020, baby, get with the program dude,” others would yell back. Yes, I guess I am a dinosaur.

With the market doing well, overall valuations extended (the S&P 500 now trades for 22x pre-pandemic earnings) and relatively few undervalued stocks to be found, it has been easier to find overvalued securities. Even if many folks don’t get into the short selling game, I still like to highlight examples of overpriced names, so maybe at least the bulls will consider taking some profits or minimizing their exposure.

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There are plenty of candidates, but my choice today is Trupanion (TRUP), a pet insurance company based right here in Seattle. TRUP shares went public in 2014 at $10 and currently trade for $92 each, having made a new all-time high today. The company’s market value is $3.4 billion; a valuation of roughly 5.7x estimated 2021 revenue of $600 million.

If you are blown away by the fact that an insurance company can trade for nearly 6 times forward projected revenue, you are not alone. Oh, well, surely this company has some pretty impressive profit margins to warrant such a premium valuation, right? Not so much…

For the first six months of 2020, TRUP’s revenue was $229 million and net income was $220,000. That was generously rounded up to earnings of 1 penny per share (it actually comes out to 0.6 cents).

So what’s the deal? Well, you guessed right. Trupanion is not an insurance company at all, but rather it’s a recurring revenue monthly subscription service for your pet. Sorry, how could I be so stupid… it says it right there in the company’s income statement:

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Let’s not be fooled by terminology. They sell pet insurance and the average monthly policy premium right now is $59 per pet and rising much faster than inflation. I have to wonder how many new pets they will sign up as the price keeps rising towards $100 per month.

However, we should not ignore the company’s growth. Pet insurance was not a big thing in the U.S. a decade ago and younger people seem especially open to the idea now. As of June 30th, TRUP has more than 740,000 enrolled pets (five years ago that figure was below 300,000). Annual retention rates are north of 98% (Author edit 10/15/20: A reader has pointed out that the company actually reports retention in monthly terms, not annual terms. Sorry, I did not catch that. Therefore, >98% monthly retention is more like a mid 80’s annual retention rate).

I am not saying this is a bad business. Rather, I think it is an insurance business and should be valued as such. To illustrate the lunacy of the current stock market valuation, we only have to refer to the company’s own long-term financial guidance (15% operating margins before factoring in marketing costs, interest expense, and income taxes) to deduce that like other insurance products, this business model will ultimately earn net margins in the mid to high single digit range.

Even if one wants to give them a high multiple on those profits (let’s use 40x since they are growing revenue north of 20% per year) and assume a bullish long-term net profit margin (8%), you arrive at a fair value of 3.2x annual revenue. It gets more dire if you instead use a 5% margin and a 30x P/E ratio (1.5x annual revenue).

But don’t take my word for it. Trupanion actually publishes a metric every quarter called “lifetime value of a pet” and the most recent quarterly report pegged this number at $597. This metric factors in the costs of running the business, the monthly cost of the insurance to the pet owner, and the expected number of months each owner will pay based on the demographics of their animals, etc.

If we simply take $597 per pet and multiply that by their current customer base of ~745,000, we arrive at Trupanion’s own estimate of the lifetime value of their current book of business; $445 million.

TRUP’s current market value is more than 7.5 times higher than that, which surely seems to factor in a crazy amount of growth in the future. I have to think that a large chunk of that premium valuation is simply due to the bizarre notion that selling pet insurance is more similar to selling software than to selling human insurance. That seems to be quite a stretch to me, but such is the investing climate these days.

Can Penn National Gaming Live Up To The Hype?

This post is for my buddy Zach, who asked for a Hertz article several times only to have me decline. Spending a lot of time and/or energy on the topic of amateurs day-trading the equity of bankrupt companies just didn’t interest me. For the record, though, I remain long Hertz puts. Hopefully this post makes up for it, Zach, as I dig a little deeper into Penn National, a stock you bought in March in a wonderfully timed contrarian bet provided by that nasty darn virus called covid-19.

This is not the first time I have mentioned Penn National Gaming (PENN), the biggest regional casino operator in the United States. A little over a year ago I wrote about how cheap the stock looked at $18 per share. What has happened thus far in 2020 is worth expanding on.

In late January, with PENN shares trading for $26 each (enterprise value of $5.2 billion) the company announced a deal to acquire a 36% interest in Barstool Sports at a $450 million valuation. PENN will increase its stake to 50% in 2023 on the same terms, and ultimately to 100% if it chooses (at a valuation no higher than $650 million). Barstool Sports is a digital media company with $100 million of annual revenue (2019 figure) that PENN hopes will help it ramp up its online betting platform across the country.

Investors cheered the deal and PENN shares hit $38 per share by mid-February when the stock market was reaching its pre-pandemic peak. At that point, PENN’s enterprise value had jumped by $1.25 billion just from them investing $163 million into a company that both sides agreed was worth $450 million. Unsurprisingly, I saw this as a great chance to take a profit and move on.

At the worst point in March, PENN stock hit a low of $3.75 per share as its casinos were closed due to the pandemic. That’s not a typo. To save cash PENN gave its landlord, Gaming and Leisure Properties (GLPI), the land sitting beneath its Las Vegas casino in exchange for rent credits (full disclosure: while I sold PENN, I remain long GLPI both personally and for clients). That excessive sell-off was short-lived but you might be shocked to learn that PENN stock today fetches more than $55 per share even though its facilities are operating at limited capacity due to pandemic-related restrictions:

PENN.png

So, what the heck is going on? The best I can tell, a couple of things. First, Barstool Sports founder David Portnoy has been live-streaming his new part-time daytrading career (twitter: @stoolepresidente) and the entertainment value has resulted in his followers gobbling up the stock on platforms like Robinhood. Second, Penn’s management team has been talking up the Barstool Sports deal with sell side analysts and many of them are jumping on the bandwagon. Last week Goldman Sachs put a $60 price target on the shares and this week Truist Financial bumped its target from $50 to $62 per share, the highest on Wall Street.

Being the old fashioned quantitative investor I am, the first thing I do is recalculate the increase in PENN’s enterprise value since the Barstool deal was announced ($4.3 billion, with PENN’s E/V now standing at $9.5 billion) and compare it with Barstool’s annual revenue ($100 million) and the valuation Mr. Portnoy agreed to sell for ($450 million). The only logical conclusion is that partnering with Barstool is not worth anywhere near $4.3 billion to PENN shareholders and that this is yet another example of the equity market bubble in “story” stocks where the elevator pitch sounds great but the numbers don’t add up.

As buddy Zach would say, “okay, so what do you do now?” Well, it depends whether numbers or hype inform your investing decisions.

As a numbers guy, I would create a set of assumptions to form an “extreme bullish case” that goes something like this: Penn got a great deal and Barstool is really worth $1 billion, not the $450M they sold it for. In addition, the online gambling venture will boost Penn’s property level profits by 20% long term. Oh, and of course the pandemic will fade and people will eat, drink, sleep, and gamble as they did in 2019 starting in 2022.

If Penn was worth $5.2 billion pre-pandemic, let’s add the 20% and then tack on another $1 billion for Barstool. Let’s even ignore the cash Penn will have to fork over to buy the rest of Barstool. We get to an enterprise value of $7.25 billion, or $39 per share. Call that an optimistic (but not completely insane) fair value estimate (and 50% above PENN’s stock price pre-deal).

The current hype, though, follows none of that math. The bulls see the stock going up and thus believe it will keep going up. The analysts don’t want to look like idiots if they miss it (Penn is a top notch gaming operator after all), so they all slap $60+ price targets and buy ratings on the stock after this huge move higher (and they were neutral when the stock was in the 20’s in 2019 and sub-$4 in March 2020). The Portnoy contingent rejoices and counts their trading profits. Even CNBC’s Jim Cramer is bullish, this morning offering no quantitative evidence despite suggesting “the stock can go a lot higher.” And so it keeps going up, two more dollars today in fact.

What would I do if I bought the stock during the pandemic-induced meltdown and woke up 5 months later to see it trading up 1,400% from the low and being pushed by the Goldman Sachs’s of the world now? You can probably guess… I would be selling into the exuberance and making sure if I stayed long any amount that it was with just the house’s money. You can surely take that advice with a grain of salt, given that I sold based on my sub-$40 fair value estimate, but riding the momentum train has never been my game. I am quite content watching from the sidelines now and collecting the dividends from my boring GLPI shares.

Be careful out there everyone, it’s crazy times.

Even Before The Pandemic Fades, The Death of the Corporate Office Appears Greatly Exaggerated

During every recession trophy assets go on sale in the equity market but sometimes aren’t noticed because most everything looks cheap and the headlines are so ugly. Commercial real estate has served investors well for decades but the pandemic is putting landlords on shaky ground in the near-term as rent collection percentages sink from the high 90’s rate we are used to seeing.

I have long favored investing in real estate by way of the public markets and while these holdings are not doing well right now, I firmly believe the asset class will regain its dominance in time and that certain assets that I did not own coming into 2020 can be had now at amazing prices. I am focusing on office space in prime markets like New York these days, as the media would have you believe that the corporate office will never be the same again and working from home is the new normal. The stock prices are indicating a similar narrative, with share prices down 40-50% from 52-week highs.

Let’s not get too carried away. In fact, there are already signs that my longer term thesis (that workers will largely return to the office, though there will be more flexibility to work from home occasionally) is likely to come to fruition. For instance, on Monday Vornado (VNO) announced that they leased 730,000 square feet of office space to Facebook in New York City. While the press is reporting that tech companies are leading the path toward letting employees work from home well into 2021, they clearly have every intention of bringing people back when it is safe to do so. If you are investing based on the narrative that people are fleeing cities for the burbs (because if offices are not downtown, why be there?) and that the tech sector is going to lead this shift because software engineers can work from anywhere, please ask yourself why Facebook is leading this much space in the middle of NYC.

Even though we are really only in the early innings of the working from home movement, there are already business leaders who are questioning whether they can maintain the same levels of productivity, training, and problem solving when teams are scattered across a city or state. A recent Wall Street Journal article entitled Companies Start to Think Remote Work Isn’t So Great After All framed the issues wonderfully. Below are some excerpts:

“Four months ago, employees at many U.S. companies went home and did something incredible: They got their work done, seemingly without missing a beat. Executives were amazed at how well their workers performed remotely, even while juggling child care and the distractions of home….. No CEO should be surprised that the early productivity gains companies witnessed as remote work took hold have peaked and leveled off….. because workers left offices in March armed with laptops and a sense of doom. It was people being terrified of losing their jobs, and that fear-driven productivity is not sustainable…”

“In San Francisco, startup Chef Robotics recently missed a key product deadline by a month, hampered by the challenges of integrating and testing software and hardware with its engineers scattered across the Bay Area. Pre-pandemic, they all collaborated in one space. Problems that took an hour to solve in the office stretched out for a day when workers were remote, said Chief Executive Rajat Bhageria.”

“Projects take longer. Training is tougher. Hiring and integrating new employees, more complicated. Some employers say their workers appear less connected and bosses fear that younger professionals aren’t developing at the same rate as they would in offices, sitting next to colleagues and absorbing how they do their jobs.”

Perhaps my favorite part of the article was a discussion with the CEO of a company called OpenExchange, which has seen plenty of efficiency problems with remote work:

“Workers on the company’s European team said they could benefit from some in-person interaction during this time of huge growth at the company. So in late July, OpenExchange is renting a house in the English countryside, with about 15 bedrooms, so many of its employees can live and work together, while still distancing. It’s important to have people in a room and see body language and read signals that don’t come through a screen, says the CEO.”

The irony? OpenExchange is a “Boston-based video technology firm which helps run large, online conferencing events.” If a tech firm that build products for remote work is struggling with it, and a company like Facebook (where most employees sit in front of a screen all day) is leasing more office space in New York during the pandemic, maybe the office as we knew it a few months ago isn’t dead.

A rational counterargument to this thesis is that even if, say, 25% of employees work from home post-pandemic (compared with about 15% prior to it) there will need less demand for office space and rents for existing buildings will fall materially. Maybe this is why landlord stocks are down 40-50%. I think this view is overly simplistic.

An ever-expanding economy means that employee counts are almost always growing, which is why new office space is regularly built. Therefore, I would expect that any modest decline in office demand is going to show up first in reduced construction of new buildings, not the abandonment of existing ones.

Consider that maybe a company grows its employee base by 10% over the next 3 years but can get away with using the same office space it currently leases due to more remote work in the future. In that case, existing leases are still going to be renewed. Without a lot of vacancy, rents should be stable. In fact, if new construction really does drop meaningfully, it could actually put upward pressure on rents for existing space, a phenomenon we have seen a lot in recent years in the residential housing market, where in many markets fresh plots of land and skilled labor are in short supply.

The bottom line for me is that it is rare for premier commercial real estate in gateway cities across the country to be quoted on the public market for a deep discount and I think 2020 is one of those times. Fortunately, regular folks can get in on the action via the U.S. stock market rather than needing to buy up properties themselves, which is obviously not financially feasible in most cases.

Is Another Mania In Overstock Stock A Chance To Short?

Overstock.com (OSTK) has long been a volatile and controversial stock, at least in part due to its founder and former CEO, Patrick Byrne. Although I don‘t short stocks very often and do so even less in client accounts (most of the assets I oversee are in retirement accounts, where shorting is not allowed), Overstock is one of those businesses that makes for an attractive short at times; a much-hyped business with relatively poor economics that loses money. Every so often it sees a huge spike in stock price, only to fall back to earth. And then the process repeats itself at some point. Here is a chart of OSTK shares from 2003 through 2019:

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During the pandemic, e-commerce businesses have seen an acceleration in sales growth and stock prices have responded, with the likes of Amazon (AMZN), Etsy (ETSY), and Wayfair (W) surging. Overstock, despite being a secondary player, has once again seen its stock soar:

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As I often do in situations like this, I checked to see what the borrow charge was to short OSTK (stocks with smaller floats often cannot be shorted due to a lack of available shares - or in other cases investors need to pay a fee to borrow the stock which is often high enough to negate any material gains you could earn). Interestingly, the borrow charge on OSTK right now is immaterial, so I am now short the stock. While this mania in tech-related stocks may not end anytime soon, which could spoil this particular trade (insert “the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent” disclaimer here), I have little doubt that the intrinsic value of OSTK and the stock price have not moved in tandem during the last couple of months.

So how bad is the business? Well, free cash flow has been negative every year since 2015 (EBITDA negative since 2017). Revenue in 2019 was below 2015 levels. For Q1 2020, EBITDA and operating cash flow were both negative. As folks were working from home and needed to bulk up on home furnishings, OSTK saw Q2 revenue jump 109% year over year. EBITDA went from negative $20M in Q1 2020 to positive $39M in Q2 2020, as sales surged 122% quarter over quarter. This strength is likely temporary, as hard goods are typically not high frequency repeat purchases.

Overstock shares were trading for about $9 before the pandemic at the February market peak, bringing the market value gain over the last 5 months to roughly $2.5 billion. Even if Q2 2020 EBITDA was maintained in perpetuity, OSTK currently fetches a multiple of 17x EBITDA. That valuation might not seem crazy, until you consider that the brand is a second tier player, at best, and more importantly, maintaining sales at these rates over the long term is simply not reasonable. Further supporting a negative view on OSTK is the fact that the company has actively shopped the retail business to potential buyers recently and found no takers willing to offer a fair price.

Full Disclosure: Short shares of OSTK at the time of writing, but positions may change at any time

It Sure Looks Like A Bubble Is Forming Again In The Tech Sector

Apple (AAPL) stock has long been a stock market darling, but investors have generally been rational with their pricing of the shares relative to the company’s profits. At the end of each of the last 5 fiscal years, AAPL stock has garnered trailing 12-month price-to-earnings ratios of 19, 19, 17, 14, and 12, respectively (the most recent year, 2019, is listed first). Over the last few years, the market has slowly adopted the bullish thesis that Apple is more of a consumer staples company (a valuation at or above the overall market) than it is a hardware company (a valuation well below the overall market).

But something has changed as the pandemic shapes 2020 thus far. Here is the stock performance year-to-date:

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Having started the year at $293 per share, Apple stock has now gained 30% so far in 2020. Has the pandemic boosted their business somehow? Obviously not. The current earnings forecast for fiscal 2020 is $12.40 per share, up mid single digits from the $11.89 they earned in fiscal 2019. The stock’s trailing P/E, assuming they do in fact earn $12.40 this year, has surged from 19 to over 30. The sentiment shift has occurred in just the last two months, despite the fact that the underlying business is essentially unchanged.

The only logical explanation to me is that momentum-driven trading action is sending popular tech stocks to the moon and another valuation bubble is likely forming. Apple’s revenue this year is projected at $264 billion, versus $260 billion in 2019 and $265 billion in 2018. Their business is simply not enjoying an acceleration of growth that would normally cause this type of P/E ratio expansion.

The scariest thing to me is that Apple actually looks cheap on the relative basis compared to other beloved tech stocks right now. For instance, Amazon stock recently crossed $3,000, attaining a market value of $1.5 trillion (joining Apple in that group). Despite the pandemic, Amazon’s earnings are actually expected to fall in 2020 due to outsize growth in expenses. Therefore, being generous and using their 2019 earnings per share of $23.01 puts Amazon’s P/E ratio at an incredulous 131.

And yes, it gets worse. You have the money-losing tech stocks that are getting multiples of revenue that exceed the earnings multiples of many leading American firms. Take DocuSign (DOCU), a leading provider of electronic signature software that is obviously seeing plenty of demand during the pandemic. For the quarter comprising February, March, and April (the height of the pandemic; their “Christmas” so to speak), DocuSign reported revenue of $297 million (up an impressive 39% year over year) and somehow managed to lose $48 million in the process. After more than tripling in price off the March lows, DocuSign’s market cap of $37.3 billion comes out to a price-to-sales ratio of above 31 (if we annualize last quarter’s results). It makes Apple at 30 times profits look darn cheap, doesn’t it?

There are plenty of other examples that most of you are aware of so I will spare you from citing more. This momentum-based market for flashy high-tech is eerily similar to 1999. Back then we were also valuing companies on sales (20-25x multiples were common) because there were no current earnings, only hopes and dreams of a bright cash cowing future. Amazingly, the revenue multiples are higher now in many cases than they were back then. And for leading firms that are making money, Cisco, Sun Microsystems, Nortel, and Intel at 80 or 100 times earnings 21 year ago does not look as egregious as the likes of Amazon or Tesla today.

I have no idea how this will play out, but having seen something similar firsthand in the 90’s, it makes me nervous. I have no intention of putting client money or my own into things trading at such sky-high prices. I will leave that to the new Robinhood crowd.

Suicide by Robinhood User Shows Some Folks Should Consult With Investing Pros

The stories behind the Robinhood generation of investors is getting worse:

Rookie trader kills himself after seeing a negative balance of more than $700,000 in his Robinhood account

It seems that startups bringing free trades and app-based investing to the uninformed masses might need to be reined in a bit. The narrative in recent years has been that investing can be a low-cost, do-it-yourself kind of thing, where paying professionals a fee is a complete waste of money and only eats into your returns. Of course, that is only true if the small investors have as much knowledge and experience as the professionals and therefore would get zero value from the professional advice (that caveat is rarely mentioned in the same conversation).

Now yes, I am an RIA so I have a dog in this fight and you might say I am just talking my book here. But assets managed by RIAs are growing, not shrinking, and it’s not because the professionals are taking advantage of anyone. There are simply millions of people out there who know they won’t be very successful on their own because they lack the knowledge, time, and/or ability to take emotions out of the equation enough, and therefore they would rather outsource the bulk of the investing work to a pro (and gladly pay for that service). That is not to say that everyone will, or should, fall into that bucket. But many will and if you do not, then great, by all means manage your own portfolio.

Apps like Robinhood that have turned investing into more of a game like Candy Crush are making it easier for novices to venture into waters that are too deep given their background and skill set. As we saw in the story linked to above, such services probably need to have more risk controls in place and higher thresholds for advanced trading strategies (like dabbling in options and penny stocks). Instead, the opposite seems to be happening and they don’t seem to want to take responsibility (at least not yet - maybe that will change).

It reminds me of the social media companies who have created sites where anyone can sign up for an account (without verifying their identify), and then can post anything they want to the world (even anonymously). If bad things happen, the companies claim they are only serving as a platform for free speech and can’t control what people do or say. It seems pretty obvious that such a business model could pose real societal problems, but there was no plan to deal with that side of the equation.

While I can’t control what apps like Robinhood do, I can give advice. And on that front I say that only educated and experienced investors should manage their money entirely on their own without any help. That help can take many forms and does not have to mean you hire an RIA to manage your account for you while you close your eyes and pray for good results. I know myself and many pros that would gladly serve as sounding boards for investing ideas and/or in the role of a second opinion for those who want to make the final calls and actual trades themselves. If you have others to bounce ideas off of and to give you the opposing side of an investing thesis (or explain the downside risks in more speculative waters like options or penny stocks), I suspect your returns over the long term will be higher than they would otherwise. And that is even after you account for any advisory fees you might pay for such advice.

Just some food for thought… please be careful out there everyone.

Concerning Trends From Novice Investing Community

As if a global pandemic is not enough to worry about, there are troubling signs that the novice investing community is growing and trading, well, like one would expect novices to trade. If this does not remind you of the folks who quit their day jobs in the late 1990’s to become full-time day traders, it should. That did not end well and we have seen similar examples outside of the financial markets since. Remember when every day it seemed like ESPN was airing hours of World Series of Poker (WSOP) coverage from Las Vegas? There were a lot of people who quit their jobs to become professional poker players (I knew one personally) and it is safe to assume that most did not last more than a few months.

The signs in the financial markets have been growing. I wrote about the rapid and unexplainable rally in shares of soda bottler Coca Cola Consolidated (COKE) last May, which some attributed to small investors on Robinhood mistaking it for Cola Cola (KO) stock, which comes with the less obvious ticker symbol.

We are now hearing of grade schoolers who used to spend the bulk of their time playing Fortnite jumping into the Robinhood bandwagon, though it should be hard for minors to open real brokerage accounts (their parents would need to be the custodian for a UGMA account and hand over trading to their kid.

The result is some crazy trading action in low dollar stocks, regardless of underlying company fundamentals. Consider Genius Brands (GNUS) going from 30 cents to nearly $12 in about a month thanks to some turbo-charged press releases.

And then there are the rapid ascents and trading volumes of bankrupt companies, led by Hertz (HTZ), which was so stunned by the trading action in its own stock that it is trying to get permission from the court to sell fresh stock in order to help pay creditors in bankruptcy. The shares still fetch $2 each even though the company’s own disclosures explicitly state that they do not anticipate the equity being worth anything but zero. The company’s $1 strike puts expiring 6 months from now can be had for 65 cents, which is pretty good upside if one takes their risk disclosures seriously. We have seen similar moves in other bankrupt firms (e.g. J.C. Penney has tripled from its low of 11 cents).

With the S&P 500 only down 8% from its peak despite the pandemic, a resurgence of day traders among the novice crowd, and some crazy valuations in the tech-related space (any takers for Zoom Video at 37 times pandemic year revenue? How about 45x for Shopify?), it is hard to make sense of what is going on in the U.S. equity market. Some might try to keep it simple and come to the only logical conclusion; the risk-reward currently being offered by the market is far from overly attractive for the next, say, 3-5 years. Some professionals such as Jeremy Grantham at GMO are taking it even further than that.