J.C. Penney To Customers: We're Sorry

A good sign for those investors who think J.C. Penney can reverse course and fix most of what Ron Johnson screwed up:

So let's be optimistic for a moment (I still believe these bullish assumptions are possible but far easier said than done), and assume the company can get back half of the sales it has lost over the last two years and also boost profit margins back up to 2011 levels now that Mike Ullman is back at the helm. In 2011, JCP's revenue was $17.3 billion, gross margin was 36%, and EBITDA margins were 5.6%, for cash flow of $967 million.

Under a "recovered" scenario, JCP's sales get back to $15 billion, gross profit is $5.4 billion, SG&A is $4.5 billion, and EBITDA is $900 million. Macy's trades at 6x cash flow so we'll give JCP the same multiple, which equates to an equity value of $3.3 billion (net debt is $2.1 billion). Crunch all those numbers and you get a stock price of $15.50 per share, below where it trades today. So you can see why I am not loading up on the stock. That said, the bonds look like a great way to play the thesis can JCP survive without thriving.

Full Disclosure: Long JCP's 2018 senior notes and JCP Jan '14 $20 puts at the time of writing, but positions may change at any time

Even With Ron Johnson Out As CEO, No Closer To JC Penney Turnaround

Less than 18 months since he was hired to lead JC Penney (JCP), Ron Johnson has been replaced by his predecessor, Mike Ullman. Given that many industry people thought Johnson would be given all of 2013 to show signs that his store transformation plan was starting to bear fruit, the fact that he was fired in the first quarter tells me that customer traffic and same store sales have not improved this year. It also indicates that the highly publicized Joe Fresh launch was unimpressive as well. As a result, I do not think JC Penney will see sales stabilize this year, after falling 25% in 2012 (from over $17 billion to under $13 billion). First quarter same store sales are likely to fall by double-digits, making $12 billion in sales this year a reasonable estimate. As was the case last year, at that level of sales JCP will continue to lose money every quarter for a while.

Perhaps even worse for the stock, which I have been bearish on for a while now, the company is seeking to raise more money to continue refreshing their store base. Market chatter this week indicates that JC Penney is in discussions to raise anywhere from $500 million to $1.5 billion of new debt, and that comes after the company decided to tap $850 million of its $1.85 billion credit line in recent days. Add those borrowings to the $3 billion of long-term debt already on the books and it is entirely possible that by mid-year JCP will see its total debt nearly double to between $5 billion and $5.5 billion.

That amount of leverage is just as problematic for the company's equity investors as is the deteriorating retail results. Troubled retailers often trade at an enterprise value equal to a fraction of annual sales. For instance, fellow money-loser Sears Holdings (SHLD) trades at 0.2 times revenue, compared with 0.8 times revenue for a well-run department store chain such as Macy's (M). With annual sales trending towards $12 billion and more than $5 billion of debt, there is not much value left for the equity holders (at the current $15 share price, JCP's equity value is still quite high, at more than $3 billion). The company's near-term cash infusion will take a short-term liquidity event off the table, but if the retailer continues to pile up red ink, that cash will slowly bleed out, leaving the company with no way to reduce its debt load in coming quarters. That is how things could really begin to spiral out of control.

Even with its old CEO back at the helm, JC Penney is likely to struggle for a while. Bringing back coupons and heavy discounts could win back some of its old customers who left during Johnson's tenure, but then you have the problem of all of this new merchandise. The assortments in the stores were meant to be higher end and attract a different customer. JCP's old customer base does not know and/or care about Joe Fresh or Michael Graves. Not only that, but Johnson was able to sign on more fashionable brand names because he promised not to devalue their brands by offering huge discounts. No matter what the JCP strategy is going forward, it is hard to see how they can really reach profitability anytime soon.

If Ullman keeps the nicer product offerings with the high price points, the suppliers will be upset and the goods will continue to sit on the shelves. If they discount them heavily to move them out, JCP won't make any money anyway. If they go back to the old merchandise and pricing strategy, many of the store's previous customers may simply ignore them and keep shopping at the stores they now visit instead of JCP. I really don't see any reason to be optimistic here and there have been no signs from the company that things are improving at all. Johnson's abrupt firing only confirms that view.

As for the stock, there is no doubt that it is far cheaper now than it was at $42 when I first wrote a negative piece about it (JC Penney: Great New Ads, Overbought Stock). That said, it is hard to get a price target above the current $15 quote based on current fundamentals. Given how depressed the stock is and how many people are betting against it, there is upside potential on any business improvements whatsoever (and such a reaction would likely be sharp and swift), but until there are any silver linings in the company's results, I would not feel comfortable making a bullish bet on that outcome. Remaining negative here is not without risks, as things could hardly get much worse, but if they don't get any better I am fairly certain that traditional valuation metrics could easily dictate a stock price of $10 or less. Another bad quarter or two and even patient, long-term investors might decide to bail. As a result, bottom-fishers should tread carefully and watch for any signs of improvement in the actual financial results.

Full Disclosure: Long JCP put options (strike price of $20) at the time of writing, but positions may change at any time

Alright Apple, Let's Tackle This Cash Issue Once And For All

I am drafting my quarterly letter to clients right now and given the poor performance of Apple (AAPL) shares during the first quarter, it is a stock I have been adding to lately on the long side, even as it has clearly negatively impacted portfolio performance so far in 2013 (down 16% vs S&P 500 up 10%). The bullish argument is quite simple; the stock trades at a discount to pretty much every other large cap technology company. The lack of momentum in their business right now is clearly hurting the stock, but the lack of a cash plan is just as important, in my view. They need to take decisive action soon, if for no other reason than it will allow them to not keep hearing about it quarter after quarter in the future.

There is an argument out there that shareholders should not care if Apple holds its cash or uses it to buyback stock or pay dividends to shareholders. It's an academic argument really, as finance textbooks insist that a $50 per share dividend will decrease the value of the stock by exactly $50, so shareholders are not better off one way or the other.

But think about this. Right now Apple is earning about 1% on $137 billion of cash (actually, the quarter just ended so they likely have closer to $150 billion as of today, although they won't report earnings for a few weeks). They have two other options for that cash; repurchase stock or pay dividends. The idea that shareholders should be indifferent to those three choices is just silly. If Apple repurchased shares, the stock would only have to rise by more than 1% per year in the future to be serving shareholders better than their current hoarding strategy (even Apple bears would likely concede that a 2% annual return is a reasonable future outcome).

The case with a dividend is a bit more complex, but still easy to understand. If Apple pays out its cash to shareholders, the shareholder would have to reinvest it themselves and earn more than 1% per year on their own in order to be in a better situation than they are now. We could easily achieve that hurdle rate. What if you own Apple in a taxable account and have to pay taxes on those dividends? Instead of beating 1% per year you would have to earn about 1.2% per year. Again, piece of cake. What if Apple had to repatriate the cash from overseas and pay income taxes on that money before paying out the dividend? Instead of needing to earn 1.2% per year, shareholders would have to earn about 2% per year investing the money themselves. Again, piece of cake.

The math: $1 of overseas cash after repatriation taxes becomes about 70 cents, and after a 15% dividend income tax, comes out to about 60 cents net to the shareholder. Apple currently earns 1-cent per year on that $1 of overseas cash (1%). In order to be better off, the shareholder would have to earn more than 1 cent on the 60 cents they receive after all taxes are paid. That equates to just a 2% annual return.

Although hedge fund manager David Einhorn took some heat for suggesting that Apple's share price multiple would increase if the cash were used in a more shareholder-friendly way, it is hard to argue that the market is giving Apple credit for its vast cash hoard right now. The stock currently trades at around $435 per share. Net cash is likely to be around $160 per share as of March 31st, so you are paying $275 for the actual business. That business will earn $40 billion (over $40 per share) this year, more than any other U.S. company.

The idea that Apple should trade at a 7 P/E simply makes no sense. There are many reasons why it does today, and the fact that they have $150 billion stashed away earning 1% per year is a major reason why. I am buying more of the stock at current levels because I am betting this cannot go on forever. Just including the cash and using a 10 P/E (in-line with other large tech stocks) on the operating earnings of the business nets you a $600 price target for the shares (38% above current levels). Even though Apple's management team has been completely dismissive so far, I still feel strongly that this is a bet worth making. And that is what I will be telling my clients in this quarter's letter.

Full Disclosure: Long Apple at the time of writing, but positions may change at any time

As The Dow Jones Industrial Average Hits A Record High, Is The Stock Market Overvalued?

How can we tell if the U.S. stock market is getting too pricey? Well, if you watch CNBC long enough or read enough stories in the financial media, you are likely to learn dozens of ways people will try and answer that question. There is not one right answer. If there was, successful investing would be easy and it is far from it.

I decided to dig into the numbers and present one way we can evaluate the stock market at today's levels relative to prior market peaks, in order to see if we are nearing a point where we should start to get worried. I chose five of the most noteworthy market peaks over the last 25 years or so. After each of these peaks, the S&P 500 index fell at least 20% peak-to-trough. Some of the corrections were relatively normal, mild bear markets (the 1990 recession; -20% and the 1998 Asian financial crisis; -22%). Others were more pronounced (the 1987 crash; -33% and the dot-com and housing bubble bursts of 2000 and 2007; -50% and -58%, respectively).

I have graphed the P/E ratio of the S&P 500 index at each of these five market peaks. At one extreme we have the 1990's bull market led by internet stocks, which saw equity valuations easily reach record-high levels, but at other peaks the results are more uniform, with markets typically topping out with P/E ratios in the high teens or low 20's.

As you can see, today the S&P 500 sits at 16x earnings. While we are approaching levels that should be considered elevated, one can argue that another 10-15% upside in P/E ratios would not be out of line with historical data. That said, making a large bet that valuations will reach the high end of the historical range is not something I would take to the bank. To me, this data says that the market is starting to get pricey, and although we could very well squeeze more upside out of this bull market (largely because with interest rates so low, equity investors are willing to pay more for stocks), I would still be cautious. As a contrarian, ever-higher stock prices only increase my preference to raise more cash and wait for the next correction, even if we don't know exactly when it will come.

Best Section of Warren Buffett's Annual Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders: Why Buybacks Are Preferred Over Dividends

This weekend I had the pleasure of reading Warren Buffett's annual shareholder letter (an annual exercise for me) and I wanted to share a section of the 23 page document with my readers. In it, Buffett discusses why he prefers share buybacks over dividends (Berkshire has never paid a dividend). Not only did he present a clear and concise explanation, but I also think it sheds much light into the current debate at Apple, where shareholders are hoping that management there finally makes some wise capital allocation decisions, as the stock hits a new 52-week low today. I have created a PDF file consisting of just the 3 page section on dividends versus buybacks if you would like to read it.

Until JC Penney CEO Ron Johnson Admits Reality, It's Hard To Be Bullish

The entire premise of the JC Penney (JCP) turnaround effort, led by former Target and Apple executive Ron Johnson, has been to do away with sales and just give consumers everyday low prices, a la Wal-Mart (WMT) and Target (TGT). That all sounds well and good, unless you actually learn anything about the core JCP shopper, who comes to the store for bargains. Sure, a $50 shirt that sold everyday at 60% off really is not a $50 shirt. But if the consumer pays $20 for it, they feel like they got a great deal, even if the shirt's quality is on par with a $20 comparable item at Wal-Mart or Target.

So it was not surprising to learn that as soon as JC Penney started to get rid of sales and instead just marked their products at the "real" price ($20 in the above example), consumers fled. Comparable same store sales in Q1 2012 dropped 19%, the first quarter the changes went into effect. Q2 comps dropped 23%, then -26% in Q3, and earlier this week JCP reported Q4 comps of -32% (which must be a record decline for any retailer in history that was not facing some sort of natural disaster or other event preventing people from making it to the store).

The first solution a CEO in this position should make is to bring back sales. If you are going to get $20 for a shirt either way, you may as well mark it such that someone buys it. And in yesterday's conference call, JCP CEO Ron Johnson announced that the company will bring back sales once a week. Sounds great for JCP bulls, right? Well, not exactly. You see, on one hand he announced that he is bringing back sales (because the consumer is demanding them), but on the other he still seems to be insisting that consumers don't need "fake" prices to understand the value proposition JCP is offering them. Consider the following quote from Johnson during Wednesday's conference call:

"So we learned she prefers a sale. At times she loves a coupon and always, she needs a reference price. Whether there's a manufacturer suggested price on a branded item, a comparison on a private label item or a sale, she needs to feel she added value to her family through the saving she got from being a savvy shopper. So we have brought back sales. We have brought back coupons for our rewards members, although we still call them gifts and we'll offer sales each and every week as we move forward. But we will do it differently than we did in the past."

Okay, fine. But then here was the very next thing out of his mouth:

"We don't need to artificially mark up prices to create the illusion of savings. We can offer the industry's best everyday prices and deliver even more exciting value through our promotions. Let me give you an example through our recent experience with jewelry at Valentine's Day. Forever customers have asked the question, what is this piece of jewelry really worth? While we want to show the customers the value we offer, so we had nearly all of our jewelry appraised by IGI, the world's largest gemological institute and provided our customers with a true appraisal of our jewelry for insurance purposes. We then price the jewelry below the appraised value. During Valentine's Day we offer the customer an additional 20% savings and our rewards customers a onetime box of See's Candy with every purchase over $75 and it worked."

I nearly fell off my chair when I heard Johnson say this. The first paragraph is an admission of what we have learned over the last year at JCP; consumers will only buy their items when they get a marked down price, even if the original price on the tag is never what anyone ever actually pays. And then, in the very next breath, Johnson says "We don't need to artificially mark up prices to create the illusion of savings." Excuse me? You just said that you have learned that your customer needs a reference price (such as a tag with a MSRP), which is an artificial mark-up by definition (since nobody ever pays the full price), and at the same time that you do not have to create the illusion of savings. But that is exactly what the entire business model of constant deep-discounts and couponing requires!

So, yes, when other commentators call Johnson delusional, I can't help but think they might be right. And he even takes it one step further. When he gives the jewelry example he states "We had nearly all of our jewelry appraised by IGI, the world's largest gemological institute and provided our customers with a true appraisal of our jewelry for insurance purposes. We then price the jewelry below the appraised value." He must think every consumer is an idiot. Anyone who has ever had a piece of jewelry appraised for insurance purposes knows that the appraised value is always higher than the price you actually paid. Johnson is married, so surely he bought an engagement ring and had it insured, so he knows this. And yet he wants us to think that getting JCP's jewelry pieces appraised and the selling them at 20% off that price is not an "artificial price that creates the illusion of savings?" That is exactly what it is (which, by the way, is perfectly fine since it works in the store).

If you are an investor in JCP, 2012's financial results quarter-by-quarter, combined with Johnson's comments during the latest conference call, have to make you wonder what on earth is going on inside his head. He acts and talks like he is a marketing genius and smarter than everyone else but his customers are voting loud and clear by shopping elsewhere.

So what about the stock? It traded down 15% on this latest earnings report and is once again in the high teens. Management has lost credibility and has proven they do not have a handle on the business. Last year they publicly predicted that the second half of the year would show improvement after a first half comp store sales decline of 21%. This statement baffled me and I even wrote in my last JCP post that I thought the fourth quarter would be their worst of the year since the holiday season depends on discounting the most and that was exactly what they were abandoning . I postulated that sales could drop 30% in Q4 (read that article here: "An Inside Look at the New JC Penney") and many JCP bulls thought that was far too pessimistic. It turns out that I was 2% too optimistic, as sales fell 32% during the holiday quarter.

Until JCP's sales stabilize, I cannot any reason to invest in the stock. We simply do not know where the floor is and management has no clue either. In fact, considering that Q1 2012 comps were down 19% and Q4 2012 comps were down 32%, even if sales stabilize, you are still looking at further comp sales declines for the first 9 months of 2013 (dropping 13% in Q1, followed by a 9% drop in Q2, and a 6% drop in Q3, leading into flat sales in Q4). One could also try and project Q1 2013 sales by looking at the Q4 to Q1 sequential drop off from last year (-42%). Using that same sequential decline for 2013, Q1 sales would actually fall by 28%. I think -13% is closer to the right number, but only time will tell.

Full Disclosure: No position in JCP at the time of writing but positions may change at any time.

Would David Einhorn's Apple Preferred Stock Idea Really Create Shareholder Value?

This week hedge fund manager David Einhorn, whose investment management firm owns more than 1 million shares of Apple (AAPL) stock, publicly urged the company to take more meaningful action on its ever-rising cash hoard of $137 billion. Since management is not really taking the matter very seriously, despite the fact that every dime of that $137 billion belongs to the shareholders, Einhorn has proposed an alternative idea to unlock shareholder value; issuing preferred stock to existing shareholders, at no charge, with a 4% perpetual dividend.

His thinking revolves around the idea that Apple shares are not adequately valuing the cash on the company's balance sheet, and issuing preferred stock would actually boost shareholder value because the new stock would have a quoted value in the market that investors could actually monetize if they chose to do so. Einhorn is saying that if implemented, Apple shares post-preferred issuance would be worth more than they are today (because he does not think Apple common stock would fall by $100, the value of the preferred given out). In addition, the 4% dividend on the preferred stock would increase the company's dividend obligation by less than $4 billion per year, which would easily be covered by future free cash flow and not eat into the current $137 billion cash balance.

So does this plan have merit? I think it does, but I would agree with many who say that it is an overly complicated solution to a relatively simple problem. That said, if Apple is unwilling to take more traditional steps for the benefits of shareholders (after all, Tim Cook and his team work for us), then an idea like this is worth considering (to be fair, since a large portion of Apple's cash is overseas, repatriation tax issues complicate their possible strategies quite a bit).

Interestingly, today I read a post by Aswath Damodaran, a well known finance professor at NYU, who argues that Einhorn's idea would generate no shareholder value whatsoever. How he can make such a bold claim, to me, is quite odd. It is true that the idea right now is all theoretical, and there is not a way to know for sure how much the market would value Apple's common and preferred shares if such an issuance was implemented, but Damodaran equivocally states that value can not be created out of thin air. Here is his exact quote:

"You cannot create value out of nothing and giving preferred stock to your common stockholders is a nothing act, as far as the value of the company is concerned."

This concept is along the lines of something you are likely to find in a finance textbook. Damodaran would likely argue that a company is worth X, based on the discounted value of future expected cash flows, plan and simple, and slicing and dicing paper does nothing to change that.

I would respectively disagree for a fairly simple reason. I believe that something is worth what someone else is willing to pay. You have probably heard people say that a lot in a wide variety of contexts. For instance, if you are selling your house, just because it is appraised for "X" does not mean that is what it is "worth." It is only worth the amount that a buyer is willing to pay you for it. Which is why real estate agents value their clients' homes using "comps," which are actual sale prices for comparable homes. Original asking prices, or appraised values, are not considered because they are not "real" prices.

The same is true of stocks. At any given time a share of stock is worth the market price, plain and simple. If Apple stock is trading at $470, as it is today, that is what you can sell it for. As a shareholder, that price represents its value to you. At that moment  you can either choose to own one share of Apple or $470 in cash. No other option exists.

Now, an analyst, or portfolio manager, or finance professor can do some number-crunching and conclude that they believe Apple should be worth more than $470 per share (in fact, both Professor Damodaran and I agree that Apple is a bargain currently), but just because someone believes that to be the case does not make it true. In order for our opinions to be proved right, the market has to price the stock at that level. That is the only way we could ever actually sell our stock for a higher price.

Investing in a stock is making a bet that its market value will be higher in the future, affording us the opportunity to sell our shares and make a profit. Professor Damodaran makes the philosophical argument that price and value are not the same, but I respectfully disagree. A share of stock is only worth what someone else is willing to pay and the price someone is willing to pay is the current market price.

So, back to the case of Apple. If the company took David Einhorn's advice and gave investors $100 of preferred stock for free, for every share of Apple they owned, it is entirely possible that Apple common stock would trade above $370 (the current price less $100). We cannot prove that unless it actually happened, but it is a reasonable conclusion to draw based on Apple's earnings power ($40 per common share in trailing EPS post-preferred issuance).

In fact, if Apple common shares fetched a 10 P/E, as Einhorn projects, the stock would be $400 and shareholders would then own $500 worth of Apple securities ($400 common plus $100 preferred). Considering that they can now only get $470 for their shares, there would indeed be $30 per share of "value creation" for shareholders. Again, Apple stock is only worth what someone is willing to pay. That amount is the current price. no more and no less. For anyone to argue that no value would have been created for investors in that scenario seems illogical. Price and value are one and the same because there is no guarantee that anyone will ever be willing to pay you what you perceive the value of something to be (how frequently that occurs will determine how good of an investor you are).

I remember reading about a line delivered by Donald Trump in 2007 when asked about his net worth. Here is the exchange:

Trump: My net worth fluctuates, and it goes up and down with the markets and with attitudes and with feelings, even my own feelings, but I try.

Ceresney: Let me just understand that a little. You said your net worth goes up and down based upon your own feelings?

Trump: Yes, even my own feelings, as to where the world is, where the world is going, and that can change rapidly from day to day ...

Ceresney: When you publicly state a net worth number, what do you base that number on?

Trump: I would say it's my general attitude at the time that the question may be asked. And as I say, it varies.

In this case Trump is using the same definition of value that Professor Damodaran seems to be using. Trump says his net worth is X. That is the perceived value, which is why he thinks it can be different based on how he "feels." Of course, we know that net worth is a technical term. There is no perception involved. His net worth is the amount of money that would be left over if he were to sell all of his assets and repays all his debts. Plain and simple.

As for Apple, I am hopeful that Einhorn's public challenge of Apple's capital allocation policies kick-starts some changes at the company. There is no doubt in my mind, and many are in agreement, that the current market price of Apple is largely discounting the value of its massive $137 billion cash hoard. There is no other explanation as to why the stock current trades at a trailing P/E of only 7, especially when you compare it with other technology stocks.

Full Disclosure: Long shares of Apple at the time of writing, but positions may change at any time

S&P 500 Index Reaches 1,500 Again: A Multi-Decade Triple Top

If you are thinking we have seen this level on the S&P 500 index before, you are absolutely correct. As you can see, the last 16 years or so has been a roller coaster ride, with three separate bull runs to around these levels, and the prior two have ended badly thanks to bubbles bursting (dot-coms in 2000-2001, housing in 2008-2009). So do you want the good news first or the bad news?

The bad news is pretty evident from the chart. We have reached a triple top and U.S. stocks have now risen 125% from their lows made in March 2009. That is a huge move in just the last four years. It warrants being cautious in the short term, as the market does feel overbought here.

The good news is actually pretty good though. At the March 2000 peak of the dot-com bubble, the S&P 500 reached 1,553 and the index components earned $56 in profits. P/E ratio: 28 (the highest ever recorded). Students of market history should have realized that stocks were dramatically overvalued. (Author's note:As a college sophomore at the time, I was less than well-versed in market history, so it was the beginning of my history lesson, and a very good one at that).

At the 2007 peak of the housing bubble, the S&P 500 once again pierced the 1,500 level, topping out at 1,576. Earnings for the index hit $88, giving the market a P/E ratio of 18. That is still a high valuation, but rather than being unprecedented, the market was simply at the top end of its historical valuation range. Dangerous, yes, but not unheard of.

You can see where I am going with this. Today the S&P 500 sits at 1,502 and 2012 earnings are likely to come in around $100. That P/E ratio (15) is only slightly above the long-term median of 14. So the U.S. stock market is not materially overvalued as it was in both 2000 (by a large margin) and in 2007 (by a smaller margin). Now, that does not mean we cannot see stock prices fall meaningfully from these levels. After all, P/E ratios aren't everything (despite the dot-com bubble being far more dramatic in terms of overvaluation, the market actually fell more after the 2007 peak because the economic shock was larger), but U.S. corporations are now earning enough in profits to justify the S&P 500 trading at 1,500, especially compared with the two prior peaks on this long-term chart.

My takeaway: it makes sense to be cautious, but not alarmed.

The Most Entertaining CNBC Segment Ever: Ackman vs Icahn

Yeah, I don't think they like each other. It's rare that two hedge fund titans are on the opposite side of such a controversial trade (Herbalife HLF) and in this case the result is an on-air feud. If you have any interest or follow Ackman, Icahn, Herbalife, and/or activist hedge funds, you might find this as entertaining as I, and many others in the industry, did on Friday when this altercation unfolded live on CNBC.

VIDEO: CNBC: Ackman vs Icahn 01/25/13 (27 min 39 sec)

Wow: Apple's Round Trip Back Below $450 Brings Trailing P/E Down To 7x

That kind of looks like a mountain landscape I would see from higher elevations out here in Oregon, but instead it is a 1-year chart of Apple (AAPL) stock. After Tuesday's solid but uninspiring fourth quarter earnings report, Apple's quick fall from perceived market darling to "just another large cap tech stock that is being passed by on the innovation front" has reached a crescendo. The magnitude of the drop from the September high of $705 now sits at -37%. Instead of $800 price objectives, some are suggesting $300 may be more fitting. How times have changed in just four months.

Apple earned $44 per share last year, giving the stock (at the current $445 quote) a trailing P/E of 10x. Free cash flow in 2012 was $47 billion, giving the stock a 9x free cash flow multiple. The P/E is actually lower if you use free cash flow instead of reported earnings. That hardly ever happens and shows you just how cheap the shares are right now. And don't forget the $137 billion ($145 per share) of cash that Apple has in the bank). Subtract out the cash position and investors are getting Apple's operations for just $300 per share ($285 billion). That equates to a trailing P/E of 6.8x and 6.1x times last year's free cash flow.

How do those numbers compare to others? The P/E is lower than Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, IBM, and Oracle. The free cash flow multiple is unheard of. Try finding any other company that trades at 6x free cash flow, in any industry!Now, I did write about a month ago that I thought Apple stock was cheap at $525 ("Apple Shares Now Nearly As Cheap As Microsoft: Which Would You Rather Have?") so it should come as no surprise that I think it's super cheap at $445. The point is, even if you think both their growth and margins have peaked, it is not easy to justify the stock being at $445 or $300 net of cash. The business would have to decline meaningfully from here for that to make sense.

Sure, it's not impossible, but is that the most likely outcome? Is it likely that Apple's share of the tablet market declines meaningfully? Is it likely that their share of the smartphone market declines meaningfully? Remember, those end markets are growing, so just maintaining current market share results in Apple's business growing, not declining from here. Is it likely that they never come out with any new products? A television? A lower cost tablet for the education market to replace expensive, heavy textbooks? A streaming radio competitor to Pandora? Something else that has not yet been rumored already (those three have)?

Yes, it is possible that nothing positive happens for Apple from here on out. That they have peaked and will graduate to "old tech" like Gateway, Dell, HP, Intel, or Microsoft. But that is what the stock is priced for right now. To me, that does not seem like the most likely outcome. And if some things start to get better, or if Apple's 80,000 employees use their $137 billion of excess cash to create something new and great again, then the current stock price might look a little silly.

There is a difference between growth rates and profit margins peaking and massive deterioration in sales and profits. The stock has broken down technically, emotions are running high, analysts are slashing their price targets, and there are no catalysts to turn things around in the short term. But all of that could change fairly quickly. And given how cheap the stock is and how much money the company continues to print each day in its stores and on its web site, I just don't think fair value on Apple is a 7 trailing P/E multiple.

But we will just have to wait and see. I am willing to wait this out and will likely selectively add to client positions in the stock.

Full Disclosure: Long shares of Apple, but positions may change at any time.