Investment Banks Nothing More Than Black Boxes

Bear Stearns is gone. Lehman Brothers (LEH) is fighting to stay afloat as an independent company. Merrill Lynch (MER) is right up there with the investment banking operations of Citigroup (C) as the domestic firms with the most bad mortgage exposure. Goldman Sachs (GS) is seen as the cream of the crop, but they surely are being dragged down with everyone else too even though they reported pretty good numbers this morning.

Although the investment banks are down a ton, I have not been taking the contrarian side of that trade and scooping up any shares. And I do not plan to do so either. There are two main reasons I just do not feel comfortable investing in pure investment banks.

First, the highest margin products for these firms have either peaked this cycle already or have disappeared completely and will take years to recover. Structured products carried the highest levels of profitability, but many are no longer going to have a place within the industry. Others will take months or even years to regain their luster.

M&A activity has also peaked with the private equity boom. Deals are still going to get done, but 2007 was the peak of the cycle. As a result, overall margins at investment banks will decline as they de-lever and no longer sell as much of their highest margin products.

Second, the balance sheets at these investment banks really are black boxes from an investor prospective. Even though disclosures have improved in many cases over the last few quarters, we really do not know exactly how these firms make their money and what they are holding. Their financial statements break out categories such as sales and trading or principal transactions, but that really does not tell us what exactly they are selling and trading. Balance sheets remain quite opaque.

Without transparency and high margin products to keep profits growing (ROE's will decline as leverage comes down) and investors informed, it is really hard for me to justify investing in these firms that have no core banking deposits like traditional banks do. The Wall Street business model is just a lot more complicated than a traditional bank. As a result, the latter group is far more attractive to me when bargain hunting in financials.

Full Disclosure: No positions in the companies mentioned at the time of writing

Citigroup First Quarter Update, As Promised

JoJo writes:

"Now that Citigroup has posted its first quarter earning for 2008, do you still stand by your original analysis, or you think you have to revise it?"

Thanks for getting my butt in gear for the update I promised, JoJo.

As many of you may know, Citigroup (C) reported a loss of $5.1 billion in the first quarter, which hardly makes it easy to figure out what a more "normal" quarter would look like for them. While the losses and writedowns did go down in Q1, versus Q4, there is still plenty of cloudiness in Citi's results.

Nonetheless, there is no point in shying away from digging through the numbers, even if they are complicated, which is why I even bothered writing about Citi in the first place. The first thing I did was update my spreadsheet showing Citi's quarterly income results by segment going all the way back to 2007. This allows us to see the trend for the last five quarters. Then I added my prior forecasts from February (For those who don't recall, I projected three scenarios -- conservative, moderate, and aggressive -- each trying to pinpoint the possible earnings power for Citi post-credit bubble). Here is the data:

Citi Updated May 2008.PNG

Now, let's go through it. As you can see, the biggest obstacle to valuing Citi is the Markets and Banking segment. That division lost $5.7 billion during the first quarter, which accounts for all of Citi's total loss and then some.

It is going to take some time to really pinpoint if my projected "normal" profit range for the investment banking operations of ~$2-$4 billion is accurate. The reason is that much of the losses right now are one-time events, not recurring costs of doing business.

For example, Citi wrote down $3 billion in Q1 just on auction rate securities and monoline insurance exposures. That accounts for more than half of the investment bank's losses for the period, but those issues won't be around long term, as they are simply due to the recent credit crunch. As of right now, I'm sticking with my estimates for the investment bank, as nothing we know now leads me to think they can't earn several billion in say, 2010.

As for the other segments, the numbers are actually not that far off. The International Consumer division's trailing twelve month profit figure is right in between my moderate and aggressive forecast. U.S. Consumer is clearly strained right now, though they are not too far off from my numbers ($6.5 billion in profit for the past year, versus a conservative estimate of $7 billion). Global Wealth Management is also not too far off, so all in all I don't see the need to change much right now.

Now, you may be asking why I am using trailing twelve month profits rather than annualizing the latest quarter. Well, I'm thinking that just as 2006 and early 2007 profits were overstated due to the credit bubble inflating, the results from Q4 2007 and Q1 2008 are understated due to the extreme strain in the credit markets. By using a rolling four quarter average, I can get a better idea of what an entire year might look like rather than extrapolating just three months. That said, this formula isn't perfect either, and we will see a lot of volatility as the strong numbers from 2007 are anniversaried.

Full Disclosure: No position in Citigroup at the time of writing

Business Week Reads This Blog Too

In the current issue of Business Week, dated 4/28, an article about Citigroup (C) mentioned my conservative $22 break-up value for Citigroup in an article entitled “Where Pandit Is Taking Citi"

Although the piece failed to put the $22 number in context (it was the lowest of three projected scenarios I made - conservative, moderate, and aggressive), a special thanks to Business Week for reading this blog as part of their research.

If you would like to read the article online, I have included a link above. Links to my three Citi posts are below:

Citigroup Break-Up Analysis:
Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3

Full Disclosure: Neither a position in Citigroup, nor a subscription to Business Week, at the time of writing

Despite Writedowns and Loan Losses, Core Banking Businesses Remain Very Profitable

Since earnings season gets underway in full force this week, the headlines are going to look bad for the financial services industry as loan losses and asset writedowns lead to severe first quarter losses. However, investors need to focus on where these losses are coming from and how the core banking business is holding up during this mess.

I bring this up because the media would have you believe that the banking business is broken and loan defaults by consumers on their mortgages, credit cards, car loans, and student loans are crippling the banks. Interestingly, that is simply not the case.

Consider the first quarter earnings report from Wachovia (WB) issued this morning. The company reported revenue of $7.9 billion and a loss of more than $300 million, or $0.20 per share. That sounds bad, and it is, but digging deeper into the company's income statement reveals that more than 90% of WB's business remains extremely profitable, as you can see from the numbers below.

wachovia.jpg

Why is this important? Because these three segments represent 93% of Wachovia's business and all three are very profitable even in today's economy. Now, should you simply ignore the losses from asset backed securities and leveraged loans? Of course not. Those losses are real and are resulting in capital infusions, equity dilution, and dividend cuts that are melting away shareholder value.

That said, the banking operations are here to stay whereas record levels of structured product issuance and leveraged loans are not. For those investors who are willing to take a long term view, these large banks are going to make a lot of money from their core businesses going forward, and investors need to take this into account when trying to value financial stocks. Wall Street will not ignore these short term losses in coming days, weeks, and even months, and they shouldn't, but two or three years from now the core business segments highlighted above will be the driving force behind bank earnings, and as a result, bank share prices.

Full Disclosure: I do not have a position in Wachovia. I simply used their numbers as an example since they just reported this morning, before all of the other banks. Given that Wachovia purchased Golden West Financial and AG Edwards at the peak of the market, there are likely better investment opportunities in the banking sector, taking both fundamentals and senior management teams into consideration. That said, Wachovia's numbers are relevant because most banks have similar profit margins in their core banking businesses.

Citi Announces Mini Break-Up Plan, But It Should Do More

Today we hear that Citigroup (C) has decided to split its consumer business into two. While not nearly as dramatic as the real break-up plan many, myself included, have discussed, it is a start. Citi will split the consumer business into two parts: consumer banking and global cards. The global card segment will include both U.S. and international credit card lending.

I think CEO Vik Pandit has the right idea here, but for Citigroup shareholders to really see full value realized for the company, they need to split off global wealth management, consumer banking, and corporate banking from each other.

Just my two cents...

Full Disclosure: No position in Citigroup at the time of writing

Related Posts:
Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 1
Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 2
Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 3

Jamie Dimon Steals Bear Stearns

As if JPMorgan Chase (JPM) CEO Jamie Dimon needed to prove himself anymore. The banking giant has already navigated these treacherous waters better than their competitors and now they find themselves in a unique position to be the best situated to take over Bear Stearns (BSC). With a well capitalized bank being the only logical choice for a takeover, JPM was really the only one with a balance sheet strong enough to get a deal done. Without any real alternative bidders, Dimon was able to avoid bidding against himself and named its price: $2 per share, or about half the value of Bear's NYC headquarters.

The Bear Stearns debacle, ending as an orderly liquidation, highlights how important management can be in determining a company's fate. While that seems obvious, it is not always easy to figure out ahead of time that Jamie Dimon is a great CEO and Jimmy Cayne was not. Many investors like to visit management and ask lots of questions of company executives, but that strategy alone fails to really give you an accurate read on management's capability. After all, company executives always will speak highly of their firm's prospects and obviously make the bullish case to investors whenever given the chance.

To shield yourself from management bias, you need to compare what a company says to what it ultimately does. JPMorgan Chase has delivered on their claim of manageable sub-prime losses. Bear Stearns said last week everything was fine and days later they needed a Fed/JPM duo to keep them out of bankruptcy. If companies you follow/invest in consistently deliver what they say they will, you should feel comfortable banking with them. If disappointments become commonplace, be sure to keep that in mind.

So where do we go from here? Well, the investment banks are still vulnerable. They rely on short term funding and their asset base is littered with illiquid, low quality assets. When clients and funders decide to halt business with a firm like Bear, it's game over. Remember, investment banks and deposit banks are not the same. Until the Fed's recent changes, investment banks did not have access to liquidity like the banks did. Although that will change now, the Fed is being forced to accept junk collateral. Companies like Bear made almost all their money on M&A deal fees and underwriting structured products. Those markets are dead, and there is not much else a company like Bear has to prop itself up.

Given recent events, should every financial stock simply be sold? Unfortunately, it's not that simple. As you can see, our markets aren't really "free" markets. Bear Stearns needed help, so the Fed guaranteed $30 billion of Bear's assets to entice JPM to take them under their wing. Whether it is tax rebate checks, Fed backstops, or mortgage bailouts, the government will step in and help curb the problems. As a result, the downside will never be as bad as the fundamentals would tell you they could be because intervention and workouts are always a possibility.

Full Disclosure: No positions in BSC or JPM

Update I (10:00AM CT):
BSC is trading between $4 and $5 per share today. Part of that is short covering and the other part is due to people speculating that someone could bid more than $2 for BSC. Don't count on it. JPM is a logical fit since they are the bank with the closest relationship with BSC. This is not about finding the highest bid. It's about finding the best partner for an orderly liquidation, since without the Fed/JPM plan, BSC goes under due to lack of financing. CNBC's David Faber also just mentioned that JPM has the option to buy the BSC building should investors vote against the $2 per share offer, so they could always just kick BSC out in such a case.

Update II (2:00pm CT):
Lots of talk today about how employees own 30% of BSC and have seen shares worth seven figures last week now worth five figures today, and how much of their net worth has been wiped out. Have we not learned anything from Enron and Worldcom? Did these employees really have the bulk of their net worth in one company's stock? If so, was it really unhedged? I definitely agree that it sucks that most of Bear's employees will lose their jobs, but if some of them had millions in BSC stock disappear overnight because of a lack of diversification and/or hedging, they need to take responsibility for that aspect of this meltdown.

Sifting Through Buffett's Annual Shareholder Letter

Warren Buffett's annual letter is always a good read and the recently released 2007 version is no different. There are a couple points that Buffett mentions this year that I think are worth pointing out and commenting on regarding the current market environment; corporate creditworthiness and sovereign wealth funds.

Buffett is often criticized for speaking out against the widespread use of derivatives and at the same time, initiating derivatives positions for Berkshire. However, just because certain derivatives are extremely risky and may pose a serious threat to our financial system, that does not mean that every single derivative contract is bad. There are many derivatives that do not use tons of leverage and pose little threat, and those are the ones Buffett is using.

In the letter, Buffett points out that Berkshire has entered into 94 derivative contracts which fall into two categories; credit default swaps and long term short put positions on several equity indices. The former is interesting because corporate credit spreads have widened dramatically recently, and investors are worried that default rates are set to spike in coming years.

Buffett has decided to insure bondholders against default over the next five years, and in return has received more than $3 billion in premiums for these contracts. He is betting that actual corporate defaults are less than the rates currently implied by the market prices of credit default swap contracts. Given that current prices are artificially high for credit protection, due to the unstable credit markets, the implied default rates right now are well above typical historical loss rates at the end of an economic cycle.

What does this mean to individual investors? It means that high yield bonds are extremely depressed right now and many smart investors are betting that the market for corporate debt has swung too far into the pessimistic camp. If you agree and believe that although earnings might fall in coming years for certain companies, they will still be able to repay their debt, then high yield bonds and credit protection are interesting areas for investment. Investors can play this two ways.

First, you can simply buy high yield corporate bonds or bond funds. High quality managers are salivating at some of the yields currently available in the corporate bond market and are more than willing to wait out this economic downturn, collect interest payments, and get repaid several years down the road if their financial analysis proves accurate.

You can also invest in a company like Primus Guaranty (PRS), a small publicly traded writer of credit default swap contracts. Essentially, Primus is doing exactly what Buffet has done, but they do it for a living. As credit spreads widen and premiums rise for selling credit protection, Primus will do more business at more lucrative prices.

Another point Buffett raises in his letter that I think is interesting is the rise of sovereign wealth funds. For those of you who are unfamiliar with the term, these are simply government owned investment funds of foreign countries. As the global economy has expanded and the developing world sees increased economic prosperity, foreign governments are flush with cash, and like anyone else in that situation, are looking for places to invest it.

As the world's biggest market, it is not surprising that the U.S. has seen China buy a 10% stake in the Blackstone (BX) IPO and Abu Dhabi invest in Citigroup (C). Of course, some on Capitol Hill are worried about foreign money being invested in U.S. companies. Although these are passive investments, and bring with them no control of operations, national security concerns are being voiced by many.

Buffett makes the point that this trend is largely the product of our own doing. The U.S. is racking up huge deficits, issuing debt to any foreign country who will buy it, and the resulting weak dollar is prompting foreign investors to invest in U.S. equities. They are simply diversifying their investment portfolio. After a while, you can only buy so much U.S. debt without getting a little worried about our country's financial health. Many U.S companies, although navigating through tough times, look more attractive than the government does for investment dollar allocations.

As a result, foreigners want to buy equities as well as bonds. Buffett points out we certainly can't blame them for buying stocks rather than more bonds. And it is much easier for them to do so now because so many financial institutions are trying to raise capital after sub-prime mortgage blunders. In my view, as long as these remain passive investments, we really can't complain. When operational decision making becomes as issue, as it was when an Abu Dhabi firm wanted to run our ports here in the U.S. (the deal was squashed), then it makes sense to talk about national security threats, but only when a real threat is apparent.

Full Disclosure: No positions in the companies mentioned at the time of writing

Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 3

I posted my extremely conservative valuation on Citigroup (C) last week and promised a more aggressive version in order to try and quantify not only a potential floor in the stock ($22?) but also a reasonable ceiling ($41?). Below in graphic form are three scenarios; my first one (conservative) as well as a moderate and more aggressive case. I will revisit these projections after Citi reports first quarter numbers, which might shed some light on their normalized earnings power.

Full Disclosure: Still no position in Citigroup at the time of writing

Related Posts:

Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 1

Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 2

Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 2

Okay, so after looking over Citigroup (C) net income by segment over the last four years (see prior post), it's time to make some projections about the future profitability of the company. First, I am going to do an extremely conservative valuation to try and find out what our likely downside is with the stock. Clearly, these are simply educated guesses at this point, so they could prove way off base.

Nonetheless, if I make a point to be both very conservative and realistic, it will likely be a valuable exercise. As Citigroup reports future earnings (first quarter numbers are due in April), I can see how the projections are holding up and making adjustments if needed.

Sticking with the conservative view, I am going to use a price-earnings ratio of 10x for each of Citigroup's businesses. One can certainly argue that some divisions are worth more than that, but I'll factor that into my more aggressive valuation model later on. For now, conservatism means 10x earnings.

As you saw from Citigroup's historical net income data, two of the four divisions are much easier to predict than the other two. Both the international retail banking operation and the global wealth management business don't see much volatility in earnings. Let's project those two areas first.

International Retail Banking:

Net Income in millions of USD (2004-2007): $3880, $4098, $4017, $4193

Conservative estimate going forward: $4000

Assuming no growth, since recent years have hovered around this level


Global Wealth Management:

Net Income in millions of USD (2004-2007): $1209, $1244, $1444, $1974

Conservative estimate going forward: $2000

New assets coming in, coupled with population growth, make this area a fairly consistent grower

*The next two areas are far more volatile, but again, I'll try and be overly conservative:

U.S. Retail Banking:

Net Income in millions of USD (2004-2007): $8010, $7173, $8390, $4108

Conservative estimate going forward: $3000

Although 2007 was really ugly, let's assume things get worse before they get better


Corporate/Investment Banking & Alternative Investments:

Net Income in millions of USD (2004-2007): $2810, $8332, $8403, ($4581)

Conservative estimate going forward: $2000

This is the toughest to estimate. Let's assume the structured finance boom days are over, go back to the 2004 number and slash that by another 30% or so.

Where does this leave us?

If these profit estimates are met, and Citi trades at a 10 P/E, the company is worth about $110 billion. Based on their share count of 4,995 million I get a fair value of $22 per share. The stock currently trades at $25 so we have about 10% of downside to my conservative estimates.

This is why I am starting to be intrigued by Citigroup as an investment in the mid to low 20's. The odds of somewhat limited downside (and tremendous upside) look pretty good. In coming days I'll post a more aggressive (but reasonable) set of assumptions so we can try and see what the upside is if Citigroup rebounds nicely in coming quarters and years.

Full Disclosure: No position in Citigroup at the time of writing

Related Posts:
Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 1
Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 3

Citigroup Break-Up Analysis - Part 1

Long before the sub-prime debacle really got going, shareholders of Citigroup (C) were clamoring for the company to break itself up into several pieces. The argument for such a move stemmed from the fact that enormously large companies get very difficult to manage. By splitting them into smaller free standing operations, they not only can be managed better, but stand a greater chance of growing if they are let loose on their own with separate management teams acting autonomously.

Although I was/am not a Citigroup shareholder, I can certainly understand this concept and think it has a lot of merit. Of course, Citigroup did not break itself up, and now the sub-prime crisis has depressed the share price so much that many pieces of Citi are doing well, but have been ignored as writedowns take center stage.

Doing some kind of break-up analysis can go a long way to figuring out how much each business unit within Citigroup is worth. This would make it easier to figure out if the current share price ($25) is too depressed, or if meaningful downside remains looking out the next year or two.

For the purpose of this exercise, I am going to split Citi into four separate businesses (domestic retail banking, international retail banking, corporate investment banking and alternative investments, and global wealth management) and attempt to value each of them on a standalone basis. That should help us determine if value investors should be intrigued by Citi's current $25 stock price or not (or at least give us some more data points to use when trying to figure that out --- it's not an easy question).

To avoid a very long post, I'll split this analysis up over several days (may as well stick with the break-up theme). Feel free to post your thoughts on Citi's valuation as well. Perhaps we can form a consensus view.

To wet your appetite, below are some important data points on the past profitability of Citi's four business units. We can use this information, plus our opinion about what the future might look like, to figure out how much Citi could earn in the future, and thus how much the stock might ultimately be worth down the road. (Update: My plan is simply to project both net income and an earnings multiple for each unit and add them up to estimate total company value. Citi's current market value at $25 per share: $125 billion). I'll post my opinions in the coming days, and please add your own if you have any strong views one way or another.

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